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Abstract 
The market for investment products, including both securities and investment 
funds, is fraught with difficulties for consumers in terms of the ease of comparing 
products, trust in suppliers and consumer satisfaction. A comprehensive approach 
to investor protection, developed around the lifecycle of a financial product, may 
offer the investor greater protection during an investment’s life span. This paper 
proposes a new approach to investor protection, building on a review of major 
market failures affecting the origination, distribution and sale of financial products 
and based on a review of the relevant scientific literature and country experiences. 
The application of a ‘know-your-product’ principle at origination, a narrower 
‘default rule’ for best execution and an ex-ante distinction between advice and 
‘information-only’ services are among the options discussed in this paper to 
enhance the investor protection framework over the lifecycle of a financial product. 
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Introduction 
The market for investment products, encompassing both securities and investment funds units, is 
perceived by consumers as fraught with problems in terms of the ease of comparing products, trust in 
suppliers and consumer satisfaction (European Commission, 2011a). Yet, investor confidence and 
protection are crucial to promote savings, investment and economic growth, as well as to foster 
retirement security. This research report considers how investor protection functions in both theory 
and in practice and evaluates the current regulatory framework. It builds upon a lifecycle approach to 
investor protection, devised to illustrate the issues at hand in a comprehensive manner and enable the 
construction of a holistic policy response. The paper is structured in three sections. The first section 
investigates the reasons that justify public intervention in retail financial markets to protect retail 
investors, based on a review of the literature. The second section presents the lifecycle approach to 
investor protection and the basic tools to ensure an adequate level of investor protection at every 
stage. Section 3 considers these tools in greater detail and puts forward ways to improve the current 
framework based on empirical evidence. The value added of this research springs from:  
i) Its outline of  a general framework for policy-making to overcome a partial approach to investor 
protection that is frequently adopted by policy-makers; 
ii) Its evaluation of different reform proposals on the basis of a review of the relevant scientific 
literature and country experiences; and  
iii) Its presentation of novel reform alternatives based on a comprehensive review of market failures 
in the sale of financial product (e.g. the separation between ‘advice’ and ‘information-only’ 
services). 
This paper considers the micro dimension of investor protection, i.e. the protection of the investor 
during the life-cycle of a financial product, from origination to disinvestment or maturity.  
1. Why do we need investor protection? 
Investor protection, while in the use of the ownership rights bundled with the holding of the financial 
instrument (such as voting rights for shares), reduces incentives to concentrate ownership and 
promotes the development of capital markets (La Porta et al., 1996), ultimately improving resource 
allocation and so increasing economic growth. At a more micro level, public intervention in financial 
markets to protect investors is justified by a number of factors that can lead to market failure. First, 
information asymmetries between originators, distributors and investors due to the nature of financial 
instruments exacerbate switching costs and conflicts of interest. Second, behavioural biases present 
among investors affect their ability to process information provided by the more informed party (e.g. 
distributors). Last but not least, investors’ financial capability, and the advice they might receive, 
shape key investment decisions for the financial security of investors.  
                                                   
 Mirzha De Manuel Aramendía is Director of Capital Markets Policy at the CFA Institute and Diego Valiante, 
Ph.D. is Fellow and Head of Capital Markets Research at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). All 
errors and the views expressed in this paper are only attributable to the authors.  
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1.1 Asymmetries of information and the role of financial innovation 
A number of factors make it difficult for investors to understand the full set of risks involved in 
investment products, including the nature of the investment process, as compared to saving. Empirical 
research has revealed that about 40% of individuals in Europe do not understand that their capital is at 
risk when investing (Chater et al., 2010). Poor numerical skills also reduce the ability of investors to 
understand even simple pricing and payoff structures. Moreover, clients do not frequently purchase 
financial services, and it is precisely the rarity of such purchases that impedes the build-up of useful 
experience.  
Due to their superior information, originators (i.e. manufacturers or issuers of financial instruments 
and products) and distributors have an incentive not only to exploit any existing asymmetries of 
information, but also to broaden such asymmetries (increasing monitoring costs for the investors). In 
particular, intermediaries may ‘churn’ clients’ accounts with transactions that are not necessarily in 
their best interest. This strategic behaviour is commonly called ‘moral hazard’, fostered by the 
inability of investors to monitor intermediaries due to the high costs. There is evidence, for instance, 
that greater availability of packaged financial products is linked to the advantage drawn by product 
originators from widening information asymmetries.1 The use of complex structures facilitates 
product differentiation and focuses competition on elements other than on price (Célérier & Vallée, 
2012).  
Information asymmetries are also present between originators and distributors. Research has found 
evidence of poor professional skills among sale representatives and financial advisors who failed to 
understand the risks and characteristics of the products they sell (FSA, 2007). Innovation in product 
structuring exacerbates this problem, unless continuous training is provided. 
Therefore, innovation in investment markets may lead to growing product complexity also for more 
professional investors (FSA, 2007; IOSCO, 2012), even though there are also cases in which 
innovative product structuring can simplify the understanding of the risk by the investor. Innovation is 
driven both by supply and demand factors and can increase choice in the marketplace to the benefit of 
investors. However, innovation may lead to higher product complexity in two respects: 
­ Greater information asymmetries, by bringing in potential difficulties for investors to understand 
the pattern of costs/returns and the risks embedded. Some features are unclear even to experts, let 
alone to retail investors. 
­ Strategic use to capture additional consumer surplus. In effect, by making product attributes 
harder to observe and compare, the competition shifts to branding and other spurious features, 
leading investors towards random decision-making at the margin. A good example is a product 
offering a high return but linked to a low probability scenario to attract clients, who struggle to 
balance the two aspects in their investment decisions (IOSCO, 2012). Moreover, innovation may 
be used to reset accumulated knowledge and experience, keeping the pool of unsophisticated 
investors stable over time (Célérier & Vallée, 2012). 2 
There is also evidence that the sale of packaged financial products tends to be more lucrative than the 
sale of plain vanilla securities (IOSCO, 2012). However, when investors (in particular smaller ones) 
demand features associated with complex product structuring, such as capital protection, it becomes 
difficult to disentangle demand factors from supply factors. As a consequence, financial innovation 
requires carefully balanced supervision to avoid, on the one hand, hampering liquidity and investor 
                                                   
1 In this paper, packaged financial products are all financial products that have a manufactured component 
linked to an underlying investment. This manufactured component is not an asset per se, whether its underlying 
is a physical asset or a financial contract (e.g. swap). Units of investment funds (e.g. UCITS ETF) or unit-linked 
insurance products would therefore be considered packaged financial products. 
2 Anecdotal evidence suggests the presence of strategic behaviour in the marketplace. For instance, packaged 
financial products distributed by high-street banks tend to be more complex than those offered by private banks 
or wealth managers (Célérier & Vallée, 2012). 
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choice and, on the other, mitigating potentially adverse effects of strategic behaviour, at both the point 
of origination and sale.  
1.1.1 Inability to observe or benchmark performance 
Many financial products and services qualify as so-called ‘credence’ goods, which means that their 
performance is difficult to observe or benchmark even after purchase. An investor purchasing an 
equity fund will observe the interim performance of the fund at given intervals but will not be capable 
of assessing the overall performance until redemption. Moreover, the overall performance of the 
individual fund will say little if it cannot be compared or benchmarked against the performance of 
similar funds, while simply establishing the universe of comparison will be problematic. Investment 
advice is a further example of a credence good, where the quality of the service purchased cannot be 
established, even after consumption, because benchmarking cannot be properly performed against an 
infinite set of potential scenarios (Darby & Karni, 1973). 
The credence attribute, which is the prevailing characteristic of financial services and products 
(Pacces, 2000), may crowd-out high-quality products, through a process generally defined as ‘adverse 
selection’. Since the inability to observe performance prevents investors from inferring higher quality 
with higher prices anymore, this situation facilitates product differentiation based on branding and 
other non-substantial elements. It also explains the high weight carried by ‘trust’ in determining 
investment decisions (Chater et al., 2010). To a large extent, trust is as an emotion based on 
psychological impressions used by the investor to forecast the expected quality of the service.  
1.1.2 Switching costs  
Moreover, experience and credence attributes entail transaction-specific investments (sunk costs) that 
deter clients from switching providers (Renda et al., 2009 p. 97). As mentioned, investors compensate 
for their inability to observe performance by relying on trust, which in turn is gained through previous 
interactions with the service provider (FSA, 2002). Such interactions represent the sunk cost that the 
investor would forego if it changed providers – while facing at the same time the cost of establishing a 
new relationship. 
Switching costs in financial services are generally high, especially for small investors. They include:  
i) Transaction costs, such as search costs, information costs or learning costs related to complexity 
and information asymmetries;  
ii) Exit costs, such as exit fees, penalties or conditional rebates on other products linked to 
contractual terms and conditions;   
iii) Uncertainty costs, due to the experience and credence attributes present in the products and 
services; and  
iv) Psychological factors, closely related to behavioural biases, for instance procrastination or 
overconfidence in the quality of the provider (Renda et al., 2009, p. 103). 
The difficulty in switching providers lessens competition, reduces consumer mobility and facilitates 
the sale of additional products to ‘captive’ customers, including through tying and bundling. In effect, 
switching costs explain the strength of ‘universal banking’, whereby banks offer to their clients a full 
range of products and services beyond current accounts and ordinary means of payment, including 
investment products and insurance. In so doing, banks benefit from the trust established with their 
clients over the lifetime of their relationship. As a result, banks are well placed to assess the profile of 
their investors, possessing knowledge about their income and wealth. However, there is a downside to 
this knowledge: the more captive the client base, the higher the risk of exploitation. 
1.1.3 Conflicts of interest and opportunism 
Conflicts of interest can be defined as the juxtaposition of the duty of the provider to act in the best 
interest of its client versus its own interest (maximising its revenue, as a provider). For instance, a 
distributor may push the sale of an investment product based on the commissions paid by the 
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originator rather than on the interest of the investor. Evidence of commission bias has been well 
documented (FSA, 2002) and recognised in the marketplace. In a survey among investment 
professionals accredited by the CFA Institute, 65% of respondents affirmed that sales were driven by 
the fee structure rather than client interest (CFA, 2009). 
The interest of two different clients may also conflict, for instance, where a broker agrees to place a 
given issuance of securities among its clients. Here the interest of the issuer may conflict with the 
interest of some investors not to invest in that particular issuance (e.g. for diversification reasons). 
Another example is the preference given to the execution of trading orders by some clients. 
Ordinarily, the firm will maximise its revenue by giving preference to the interest of some clients over 
others (Walter, 2004). 
The incentives driving conflicts of interest are sometimes less clear and more difficult to observe. For 
instance, some investment products are suited to offload risks or exposures away from the originator’s 
balance sheets and/or to help the originator gather additional liquidity or own resources. Examples of 
products that might be used for such purposes are packaged products equivalent to hybrid capital or 
synthetic exchange traded-funds (ETFs) but also more plain-vanilla products used in transactions such 
as securities lending. The presence of a conflict of interest does not in itself entail damage the interest 
of investors. However, there are examples where damage has occurred, for instance, in the strategic 
sale of ‘preference shares’ to small investors in Spain until was recently banned.  
1.2 Behavioural biases 
Behavioural biases lead individuals to make sub-optimal decisions, in violation of the principles of 
rationality, given the prevalence of cognitive limitations and psychological factors. The presence of 
behavioural biases is yet another reason for public intervention in investment markets, in order to 
mitigate both their direct influence on investors and the potential exploitation by manufacturers and 
distributors. 
In describing human behaviour, policy makers only started to consider limitations and biases in recent 
years. In effect, traditional economic theories and models are based on the premise that individuals 
behave rationally. A ‘rational’ behaviour implies meeting five assumptions (Debreu, 1987):  
i) Completeness, i.e. individuals are able to compare alternatives and to make a ranking;  
ii) Transitivity, i.e. if an individual prefers A to B and B to C, so she would then prefer A to C;  
iii) Invariance, i.e. the individual should be indifferent to how baskets of goods with the same utility 
are presented;  
iv) Monotonicity, i.e. ‘more is generally good’ and does not influence preferences between two goods 
with the same utility; and  
v) Dominance, i.e. the mean of choices with same utility is always preferred or if one of the 
alternatives has a slightly better feature, it should be preferred.  
In practice, however, the human behaviour systematically violates these five assumptions, as 
cognitive limitations and psychological factors bound pure rationality and make human behaviour 
more contingent on context and less predictable. 
More specifically, three cognitive limits may induce the violation of rational assumptions (Jolls et al., 
2000):  
i) Bounded rationality;  
ii) Bounded willpower; and  
iii) Bounded self-interest.3  
                                                   
3 For instance, the ‘overconfidence bias’ means that “people tend to overestimate (to be overconfident about) the 
probability of an outcome if an example of the event has recently occurred (linked to the prospect theory and the 
precedent behaviour). Therefore, consumers are generally overconfident in their abilities and in their future 
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Bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) refers to limits faced by human beings in terms of accessible 
information, mental capacity and available time. It should be distinguished from rational ignorance in 
which the investor is not able or finds it inconvenient to put effort into understanding a clear set of 
information in a specific amount of time. In addition, individuals are often ‘path-dependent’ in their 
choices, especially when they cannot fully appraise the value of something they already possess 
(Korobkin & Ulen, 2000; Sunstein, 2000; Jolls, 2007). Bounded willpower, instead, leads people to 
act in conflict with their long-term interests, even though they anticipate negative effects in so doing 
(e.g. smoking, overspending today instead of saving for old age). Finally, bounded self-interest may 
push people to care about treating others fairly because they want to be treated in the same way. 
Agents will act ‘nicer’ or ‘nastier’ depending on how the other party treats them.  
Behavioural economists have researched and categorised biases, with useful lessons for public policy 
and investor protection (Avgouleas, 2006; Tapia & Yermo, 2007; De Meza et al., 2008; Collard, 
2009; Chater et al., 2010). Biases are present at the different stages in establishing preferences for 
decision-making and judging different alternatives (Valiante, 2008, p. 24):    
­ In forming their judgement, investors’ preferences are very much influenced by past impressions 
and emotions, as opposed to factual analysis, and they tend to ignore disconfirming evidence. 
Most judgements are inferred from readily available or familiar information, which explains for 
instance the tendency to overestimate future gains in bullish markets. In effect, judgements are 
largely based on reference points, which can be anchored and adjusted by the investor in a self-
serving fashion as well as by interested third parties. 
­ Investors’ preferences in the decision-making process are shaped by loss aversion, meaning they 
are more sensitive to losses than gains (framing). Loss aversion manifests itself in different ways, 
such as a reluctance to sell at a loss, as a decision perceived as a ‘loss’ will make individuals more 
risk-seeking. Asking a higher price in a sale than one is willing to pay in a purchase reflects the 
endowment effect, which is a bias combining loss aversion and the status quo. In addition, most 
investors would prefer a small gain today over a larger one tomorrow – in other words, they apply 
disproportional discount rates.  
­ Social preferences and cultural factors also influence individuals’ behaviour, meaning that biases 
depend on background to some extent. Some countries for instance exhibit high savings rates and 
low consumer debt, in contrast to the preference for immediate gains observed in other regions. 
Investors are also prone to delay the moment of taking a decision and base their action on 
insufficient information. Individuals have a tendency to procrastinate, which explains for instance 
why they shop around very little even for important purchases.  
The credence attributes of investment services can magnify the effects of cognitive limits on judgment 
and decision-making processes. These biases expose investors to framing by third parties, including 
originators and distributors who may behave strategically. For instance, the purchase of a higher-
margin product may be strategically induced via information overload and the anchoring of 
expectations (e.g. “Outside clients get 4% but with your history at our branch I could bargain for 
5%”). Product structuring can also be devised strategically to profit from behavioural biases. For 
instance, investors tend to overestimate the probability of a favourable outcome if it depends on 
several specific conditions rather than a general one, a bias that can be easily exploited by structuring 
the product in such a fashion (Célérier & Vallée, 2012, Table 7). Policy responses to behavioural 
biases range from the targeted design of educational programmes to the factoring of biases in 
regulation and institutional design. Annex 1 provides an overview of policy responses, which are also 
considered in the next sections. 
                                                                                                                                                              
fortunes. For example, many people invest, believing that they can beat the stock market, or they underestimate 
the risk that illness or unemployment may cause difficulty in repaying a loan” (Jolls et al., 2000, p. 54). 
6 | DE MANUEL ARAMENDÍA & VALIANTE 
Table 1. Selected behavioural biases affecting preferences in the decision-making process 
 
Note: See Table A1 in the Annex for a more complete presentation of behavioural biases and suggested policy approaches. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Chater et al. (2008) and Valiante (2008). 
1.2.1 The individual circumstances 
From a micro-perspective, investor protection is aimed chiefly at fostering incentives for individuals 
to participate in financial markets, by promoting savings, smoothing consumption and increasing 
future income security. Investment decisions are crucial for individuals, in particular for those with 
fewer resources, since investing may put their financial security at risk. Their importance is also 
paramount when it comes to preparing for the long-term, including retirement. Overall, investor 
protection facilitates the allocation of capital to those that value it more. 
Uncertainty and risk are inherent in any investment process; the principal invested is invariably at 
risk, either explicitly or implicitly, given the counterparty risk. Market and non-market risks are the 
main determinants of performance. However, leaving risks aside, the final outcome for investors also 
depends on product adequacy and costs. A product is adequate for an investor when it matches its 
individual profile, which is given by i) its ability to bear potential losses without putting its basic 
financial security in jeopardy and ii) its preferences in terms of risk and return, given that some 
investors are more comfortable with lower risks than others (e.g. capital protection). Costs (fees and 
expenses) also determine the outcome of the investment process, since they can significantly reduce 
net performance – for instance, an annual administrative charge of 1% of a pension accumulation will 
reduce the total accumulation by as much as 20% (Barr & Diamond, 2010; De Manuel, 2013). 
But beyond objective adequacy and costs, there is a subjective dimension that is at least as important. 
Subjective adequacy could be defined as the alignment between the characteristics of the investment 
product and the individual’s expectations. A product may be objectively adequate for an investor but 
if s/he does not understand how the product works and the risks embedded, there is a high probability 
that the investment process will lead to an unsatisfactory outcome. Expectations are difficult to 
manage given behavioural biases, which also shape individuals’ reactions versus investment 
outcomes. An experiment conducted in the UK to understand reactions to volatility and loss showed 
that irrational behaviour is linked to the lack of familiarity with investing rather than the non-
provision of relevant information before investing (NEST, 2010). In this experiment, individuals 
played a simulation where they invested in a private pension, having received information about the 
functioning of the investment, including the likelihood of interim losses. When interim losses 
materialised in the simulation, those individuals who were less familiar with investing reacted with 
surprise and anger – they felt ‘cheated’ out of the money, ‘robbed or ‘misled’ and looked for someone 
to blame or punish (NEST, 2010, p. 31). These individuals perceived themselves as ‘passive victims’ 
rather than active investors. The experiment illustrates that disclosure is not enough to ensure product 
adequacy since some investors are unable to process the information disclosed.  
 
Judging Alternatives
•Self-serving bias
•Optimism
•Anchoring and adjustment
•Representativeness heuristic
•Hindsight
•Social preferences
Making Decisions
•Procrastination
•Information overload
•Overconfidence
•Framing
•Loss aversion
•Immediacy or hyperdiscounting bias
•Endowment effect
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1.3 Financial capability and generic advice 
Financial education and generic advice are first-order tools to improve investor protection and 
overcome market failures. These tools can improve financial capability, i.e. equipping individuals 
with the knowledge and skills to meet their current and future consumption needs with their available 
resources. In effect, a lack of knowledge and interest are the main reasons why people do not invest, 
followed by a lack of available resources (FSA, 2011a, p. 16). Where people overcome inaction and 
do invest, insufficient financial capability will ordinarily lead to second-best outcomes. In facilitating 
better investment decisions, higher financial capability holds the potential for individual and 
collective welfare gains.  
Financial capability is difficult to concretise, observe and measure in practice. Research conducted for 
the FSA identified five specific domains or areas of financial capability (PFRC, 2006). Three of these 
areas directly affect the process of making investments:  
i) Planning ahead (the ability to anticipate and prepare for future financial needs);  
ii) Staying informed (the monitoring of changes in the market for financial products, advice services 
and the wider economy); and  
iii) Choosing products (knowledge, attitudes and behaviour towards financial products and their 
purchase).  
While the other two areas identified by the FSA refer to more basic abilities:  
i) Keeping track (the ability to monitor day-to-day spending and finances); and  
ii) Making ends meet (the ability to meet expenses with available resources).  
A 2006 survey estimated that only 36% of the UK’s population was capable in the five domains. 
Conversely, about 64% of the UK’s population had one or more weak areas, as represented in the 
figure below. 
Figure 1. Financial capability in the UK (% of population with strong areas) 
 
Source: PFRC (2006). 
 
The OECD International Network on Financial Education (INFE) has also developed a framework to 
measure financial capability along similar lines (Kempson, 2009). In 2010-11, a pilot survey was 
carried-out in 14 countries, including six EU member states and Norway (figure below). The results 
reveal that literate individuals make up on average less than 50% of the total population (Atkinson & 
Messy 2012). For instance, less than half of the respondents seemed to understand the impact of 
compounding in every country surveyed but Norway (46%). Even more worryingly, in terms of 
behaviour, very few individuals appeared to shop around and seek independent information or advice 
– the maximum score belonging to the UK (16%). 
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Figure 2. Financially literate population in selected OECD countries (% of population in each 
domain) 
 
Source: Atkinson & Messy (2012). 
Aptitudes and emotions limit the effectiveness of traditional approaches to financial education in 
raising the level of financial capability (De Meza et al., 2008). In an experiment conducted by NEST 
(2010), explanations given to individuals about the functioning of long-term investment products were 
not assimilated – when confronted with interim losses, individuals reacted irrationally, exhibited 
surprise and were inclined to stop contributions. However, in the same experiment explanations given 
about the impact of inflation on the value of pensions were well assimilated. In effect, individuals 
process information selectively. 
To achieve lasting effects on knowledge and behaviour, the design of financial education programmes 
is crucial and should:  
i) Focus not solely on formal learning but also on practice and behaviours;  
ii) Intervene early, with specific programmes directed at children and young adults; and  
iii) Continue to be readily available through adulthood, including through the provision of generic 
advice.  
Traditional education is effective in raising arithmetic and statistical skills, which are highly 
correlated with financial capability. For instance, investors make worse decisions where fees are 
framed as percentages or not compounded returns (Chater et al., 2010; Atkinson & Messy, 2012). In 
effect, poor statistical and maths skills lead investors to estimate probabilities wrongly, returns and 
costs, which producers and distributors can exploit. Generic education in these fields should ideally be 
complemented with specific practice in a financial context. It has been consistently found that practice 
at looking for and purchasing financial products is a key determinant of financial capability (Chater et 
al., 2010; PFRC, 2006). Learning by doing is indeed effective, in particular if feedback is provided 
(HM Treasury, 2008).  
Changing attitudes and emotions, however, is a challenge even to meet over the long-term, and the 
effect of de-biasing techniques on investors has not been the subject of significant research. There is 
evidence that making investors aware of biases is not always effective and may even at times be 
counterproductive (De Meza et al., 2008). Some de-biasing techniques could, however, be part of 
hands-on education programmes. These mostly aim at educating individuals about the decision 
process. De Meza et al. (2008) found, for instance, that considering opposite scenarios is a useful tool 
for encouraging individuals to be critical of their own decision-making, to avoid overconfidence and 
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to limit the suppression of disconfirming evidence. Individuals who imagine they explained their own 
choice to others have also been found to make better decisions. Individuals would therefore be taught 
techniques to improve the management of their own decision-making. Other de-biasing techniques are 
more apt to be built into regulation and institutional design. For instance, procrastination can be 
mitigated by automatic enrolment in saving programmes. And information overload can be lightened 
through the standardisation of summary disclosure. Yet, some biases persist despite high levels of 
financial education and extensive experience in financial markets. A number of experiments have 
found that MBA students and finance professionals are prone to similar biases and irrational 
behaviours as the average retail investor (De Meza et al., 2008). 
Generic (non-commercial) advice merits separate attention. Formal education programmes take place 
during childhood and youth, but financial decisions are taken during adulthood. By generic advice, we 
refer to the provision of education resources and personalised guidance to adults. It is not a product 
sales channel but an educational tool; the provision of recommendations to purchase or sell specific 
products is not generic advice. Individuals need generic advice to find answers to problems such as:  
i) Deciding whether to save or invest;  
ii) Choosing an investment product;  
iii) Understanding investment fees;  
iv) Choosing a commercial adviser and knowing what questions to ask; or  
v) Reacting to a case of misselling.4  
Generic advice can be very useful, for instance, in helping investors to overcome their naiveté about 
conflicts of interest and inducements and to understand the differences between product categories 
and the concepts used in basic information sheets. Such background information is generally not 
available elsewhere, and increasing investors’ familiarity with products and agents fosters 
participation in retail investment markets.  
2. A ‘life-cycle approach’ to investor protection 
Public intervention to protect small investors is needed throughout the whole life-cycle of the 
financial product, from the origination to the sale of the investment product and from its purchase to 
redemption. A partial approach to investor protection might be ineffective, while imposing sizeable 
costs on originators, distributors and ultimately end investors. We define partial approaches as those 
that only address one phase of the long process involved in the product life-cycle. An uncoordinated 
and piecemeal approach neglects the importance of market failures, such as behavioural biases, that 
affect the proper understanding by the investor of the risks involved in holding a financial instrument 
during its life-cycle. Increasing investors’ understanding of the risk during the life-cycle of the 
product may also ensure a longer holding period of savings and avoid investments being driven by 
risk aversion due to cyclical macroeconomic factors, which can ultimately hamper liquidity of assets 
with long-term maturities.  
The ordinary life-cycle of a financial product can be split into four phases:  
i) Design and origination of the product by the manufacturer, such as a fund manager;  
ii) Wholesale distribution of the product, where the manufacturer/issuer agrees with the 
distributor/intermediary the conditions for the sale of its products to the end investors, which may 
                                                   
4 These sample questions are taken from selected sections of the website of the Money Advice Service 
(www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk). The Money Advice Service is a UK-wide service offering generic non-
commercial advice online, by telephone and through a network of money advisers, established by the Financial 
Services Act in 2010. Similar websites exist in other countries; In France, for example, see “Le Site 
Pedagogique de l’Argent et de la Finance” (www.lafinancepourtous.com), which however is a public-private 
partnership. Some private providers have launched similar websites; see for instance Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
MoneySense (http://rbsmoneysense.co.uk). 
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also include a fee paid by the originator, such as the training and fees provided by a fund 
management house to the sales representatives of a high-street bank;5  
iii) Retail distribution where the end investor purchases the product, whether from a high-street outlet 
or through the internet; and  
iv) Duration of the investment itself, which runs from the time of purchase to the exit by the end 
investor.  
Figure 3 presents the product life-cycle and the appropriate tools of investor protection, which will be 
later explained.  
Figure 3. A life-cycle approach to investor protection (phases and tools) 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
At each stage in the product life-cycle, the range of issues that warrants investor protection is different 
and so is the nature of the tools needed. The product life-cycle should be seen as a whole, however, 
and selected intervention at each stage would only make sense if coupled with measures in other 
stages of the product life-cycle. Information asymmetries run across all the phases in the cycle and 
affect both the relationship between end investors and distributors and between distributors and 
product providers, to varying degrees.  
For end investors, asymmetries of information are present before and after the purchase, whether a 
simple lack of information led by the opportunistic behaviour of the counterparty or a structural lack 
of knowledge due to the nature of the product/service. The difficulties in observing and benchmarking 
                                                   
5 For the Initial Public Offering of shares or for the collocation of bonds, however, the commission is typically 
paid by the investor directly to the intermediary. 
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the performance of financial instruments (credence goods) typically remain after the investment ends. 
Conflicts of interest and behavioural biases are the most visible manifestations of such asymmetry of 
information. Conflicts of interest are mainly present at the design and distribution phases where 
originators and distributors try to maximise the return on their investments by extracting as much 
consumer surplus as possible. While maximising returns in the long-run would lead to serving 
investors’ interests, market imperfections, the seeking of private rents and myopic behaviour tend to 
lead to the short-term maximisation of returns, even when it runs against the interests of investors. 
Behavioural biases are most relevant during the sale process, where, on the one hand, the framing of 
choices may lead the investor to make inadequate investment and, on the other hand, distributors may 
exploit certain biases to their advantage. Yet, behavioural biases are also relevant after the purchase 
where the investor may engage in ‘buying high and selling low’ due to overconfidence bias or exiting 
a long-term investment due to disappointing short-term performance despite favourable projections 
(e.g. pension products).  
While intervention at each phase needs to be specific, it is possible to extract a number of basic 
principles that should guide intervention across all phases in the product life-cycle:  
i) A general fiduciary duty by all agents towards the principle/end-investor should be recognised 
due to structural (e.g. behavioural biases) and opportunistic (e.g. moral hazard) information 
barriers.6  
ii) Mitigation techniques for conflicts of interest should always be pursued, while the outright 
elimination should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. 
iii) Comprehensive disclosure should not be misleading or induce overload; it should also provide 
ongoing information during the duration of the contract.  
iv) Distribution of responsibilities among all agents involved in the investment decision (originators, 
distributors and investors) should be clear and effectively disclosed ex ante.  
v) Effective redress procedures, enhanced private enforcement procedures and public supervision 
(with strong international coordination in the single market) should ensure that these principles 
are upheld in practice.  
Regulation and institutional design of investor protection tools must take into account all these 
factors. As a result of the market failures described in previous sections, the various tools to promote 
investor protection can be broadly classified into three groups: 
­ Know your product rules, based on the principle that originators and distributors need to 
understand the risks embedded in the products they sell as well as the general adequacy of such 
products for the target market; 
­ Disclosure requirements, encompassing all obligations imposed on originators and distributors to 
disclose all relevant information to investors in a manner that investors are able to access, utilise 
and understand; and  
­ Know your customer rules, based on the fiduciary duty imposed on originators and distributors to 
act in the best interest of their clients, avoiding the sale of any products that are inadequate for 
them, based on some sort of assessment of the individual’s circumstances.  
Table 2 lists the most important tools under each of these groups, which are discussed in the next 
sections. 
                                                   
6 For a more detailed view, please see Valiante (2011, p. 171). 
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Table 2. Taxonomy of tools for investor protection 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
2.1 ‘Know-your-product’ rules 
As part of the fiduciary duty falling on product providers and distributors, both providers and 
distributors are required to know their product in their respective capacities. Products need to be 
designed in the best interest of the investors that the product is targeting, while distributors need to 
understand the products they sell well enough to be able to assess their adequacy for the investor. 
‘Know-your-product’ rules ensure that the entity structuring and/or selling the product does it in a 
professional and competent way that would reduce the likelihood of market failures at the source. 
Such rules, however, do not prevent the opportunistic use of information asymmetries, which are 
addressed by disclosure requirements and ‘know-your-customer’ rules. Rules apply to the structuring 
of the product, whether the latter is marketed or not to investors with a lack of knowledge (typically 
retail investors). 
‘Know-your-product’ rules affect the structuring of the financial product (before issuance, especially 
for packaged products such as transferable units of investment funds) and thus its suitability for end 
investors (after issuance).   
2.1.1 Product structuring rules 
Public intervention through regulation can in general be rule-based or principle-based. At the level of 
product design, rules prescribing the structuring of an investment product are prone to be detailed and 
leave limited space for interpretation. Product structuring rules in UCITS are probably the best 
example of product regulation.7 Among the benefits of the UCITS framework there is are the creation 
of a single market in Europe and the build-up of investor awareness and confidence in the quality of 
the retail funds complying with the framework. However, product regulation also presents a number 
of drawbacks, including: 
a) Obsolescence. Continuous evolution in markets means product rules can quickly become 
outdated. Such changes can play against both product attractiveness in terms of exposures and 
returns, as well as their security, given the emergence of risks that regulation did not initially 
control for. To overcome obsolescence, product rules need to be open to very frequent updates. 
Primary legislation should be reserved for high-level principles and objectives, clearly spelled out 
as such to ensure coherence, while secondary legislation should be delegated to supervisors, under 
                                                   
7 Product rules in the structuring of a financial product that is not plain vanilla (e.g. shares) typically set a 
regulatory framework on the instruments that can be used in the structuring phase (e.g. eligible assets), on how 
these instruments shall be combined (e.g. diversification requirements), and on how to protect the structure of 
the product from external market events (e.g. leverage limits, exposure to counterparties and collateral 
management, among others). They are different from management rules, which are concerned with the 
requirements that the intermediary has to face for the provision of specific services, independently of how the 
product they want to sell will be ultimately packaged. For instance, UCITS is an example of product structuring 
rules, while AIFMD is an example of requirements for the service provider. 
Know your 
product rules
•Suitability at product design
•Professional aptitudes
Disclosure 
requirements
•Pre-contractual product or 
service disclosure
•Ongoing disclosure
•Market data
•Ex-post disclosure (product 
or service evaluation)
Know your
customer rules
•Suitability and 
appropriateness tests
•Selling practices/advice
•Ongoing services
•Professional aptitudes
•Best execution obligation
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appropriate review procedures. Under narrow delegation or unclear principles, rules will not keep 
pace with markets and their initial objectives. The ever-more frequent revisions of the UCITS 
framework are clearly related to these phenomena. 
b) Regulatory license. The use of the regulatory license, i.e. a particularly favourable legal regime 
for a financial product or service, is useful in promoting participation in financial markets, but it 
reduces the incentives of agents to adhere to ethical and professional principles and induces a 
species of ‘moral licensing’. This effect goes both for product providers where compliance is 
limited to box-ticking and for clients who fail to conduct the necessary due diligence. Moreover, 
the regulatory seal can provide a commercial advantage that originators will be keen to exploit, 
packaging as much as possible under a regulated format and even stretching the rules (e.g. 
‘volume-based’ incentive, as for securitised products under credit ratings embedded into 
regulation). Some ‘alternative UCITS’ are a good example of this effect. In the margin, regulatory 
endowment fosters the expectation among investors of a possible bailout, i.e. a political and legal 
risk for taxpayers. Such expectations can also create more hazard for product providers.  
c) Partial representativeness. If product regulation is the tool, its utility would probably not be 
maximised by a single regulated category but rather by multiple ones. Retail investors have 
different needs and preferences, in terms of investment horizons, liquidity, exposures, returns and 
risks. A single product regulation cannot cater for all products without becoming obscure or 
fragmented, as illustrated by the debate about product proliferation in UCITS. Partial 
representativeness also means that product rules may distort the optimum allocation of savings by 
investors.  
In sum, product regulation has numerous potential benefits but it is also a complex tool for public 
authorities to manage. It is essential to factor the risks of obsolescence, regulatory license and 
representativeness into its design. 
2.1.1.1 ‘Suitability test at product design’ 
‘Suitability test at product design’ or selection criteria for packaged financial products acknowledges 
the limited incentives and informational barriers that may affect the task of originators (and 
distributors). It refers to the set of internal policies, processes and controls that should guide the 
design for product originators (and selection for distributors) of financial products, in view of the 
client group to which each product is targeted. Despite its crucial importance, suitability at product 
design is not enshrined in the legislation of key jurisdictions around the globe. As pointed out by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “it appears that countries do not have regulations that 
impose requirements on the product design process, particularly around retail products” (BIS, 2008, p 
22). The revision of MiFID, however, places the responsibility on senior management for approving 
the policy governing the services and products offered by the firm, in accordance with the 
characteristics and needs of the clients to whom the products will be offered or provided (Art. 9.6.d).8  
Doubts remain, however, on whether this approach would be sufficient to develop best practices in 
product design. At the origination stage, suitability at product design is different from product 
regulation, as it is a principle-based regulation. It should, however, embody more than a general duty 
of ‘professionalism’ or ‘fairness’ and extend to a minimum set of principles to be implemented in 
each phase of the product design process. Suitability at product design should comprise the following: 
a) In procedural terms, the intermediary should implement suitability into the process of product 
design based on clear policies, while providing for a compliance check before products are 
                                                   
8 More specifically, Art. 9.6 MiFID 2 (Legislative proposal) reads: “Member States shall require the 
management body of an investment firm to ensure that the firm is managed in a sound and prudent way and in a 
manner that promotes the integrity of the market and the interest of its clients. To this end, the management 
body shall: […] (d) define, approve and oversee a policy as to services, activities, products and operations 
offered or provided by the firm, in accordance with the risk tolerance of the firm and the characteristics and 
needs of the clients to whom they will be offered or provided, including carrying out appropriate stress testing, 
where appropriate.” 
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launched. Design should be actively engineered around the interests of the targeted category of 
clients, i.e. procedures should therefore “support the design of products appropriate for particular 
investors” (IOSCO, 2012, p. 24). General methodologies behind product structuring should be 
disclosed and made publicly available, as well as the departments and the individuals directly 
responsible for that product structuring within the company. 
b) In absolute terms, guidelines should specify a minimum set of requirements that would make a 
product suitable in practice, leaving room for manoeuvre by competent authorities. Products with 
a pattern of return, risk or cost that may be difficult for retail investors to understand, whether 
they offer a balance of costs-performance that is lower or higher than the market average for less 
complex alternatives, should be deemed not in the clients’ best interest. Products that are 
primarily aimed at offsetting risks in the balance sheet of the originator, without being offset by 
enhanced performance for investors, should also face close scrutiny. 
c) In supervisory terms, suitability at product design requires a commitment to active supervision. 
IOSCO (2012) proposes frequent thematic reviews, on-site and offsite visits, as well as the use of 
risk-based methodologies to prioritise enforcement actions. It also invites regulators to make such 
actions public to enhance market integrity and protect investors. For instance, at EU level, more 
coordination among national supervisory practices and regulations would be necessary to achieve 
consistency and reduce market distortions. 
Being largely uncharted territory, suitability at product design will need to be developed over a 
sufficient period of time, perhaps with a phasing-in period. Its ability to raise consumer surplus and to 
reduce misselling, although promising, is not clear yet and will depend mostly on implementation and 
supervision. If successful, it could open the door to dropping existing product rules. 
As a consequence, in effect, the suitability test at product design may bring some clarity in MiFID in 
relation to the long-standing question as to when a product should be deemed ‘complex’. There is a 
growing concern among regulators and supervisors that intermediaries may use product complexity 
(i.e. the understanding of risk, returns and costs) opportunistically to the detriment of investors, in 
particular by obscuring costs, risks and returns to extract a higher surplus or raise own resources. 
Suitability at product design would, in effect, shift the attention of supervisors to the investors’ 
understanding of returns, costs and (market and non-market) risks for the product under all potential 
scenarios, thereby avoiding an expression of preference for a specific asset class and bearing in mind 
that the product would have been designed with the level of sophistication of a specific target 
audience in mind. 
Furthermore, exposure to sudden illiquidity or an issuer’s credit risk, as well as the use of financial 
leverage, is another relevant concern for supervisors (IOSCO, 2012). While product complexity 
remains largely undefined, it is the impact of complexity on suitability that matters. Products that are 
designed in a way that the risk-reward profile and costs cannot be disclosed in a standardised format, 
such as the key investor document or KID, could be deemed as excessively complex and generally 
unsuitable for non-professional investors. Such complexity in the risk-reward profile frequently arises 
from complexity in the product structuring, although a complex structure does not necessarily make 
the product risk-reward profile difficult to understand. Yet, in determining the risk-reward profile of a 
product, not only the expected returns and market risks matter, but also any non-market risks and all 
costs related to the product, which are typically associated with complex structures. 
Suitability at product design would therefore reduce the likelihood that complex products whose risk-
reward profile and costs under all potential scenarios cannot be easily understood will be delivered to 
non-professional investors, since the product is already designed with a category of investors in mind. 
Should the ex-ante test for suitability at product design be unable prevent complex products from 
reaching non-professional investors, supervisors may consider completely banning their sale to non-
professional investors or the exclusion of the product from execution-only services, non-advised sales 
or sales with pre-sale information services (influenced by inducements).  
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2.1.2 ‘Know-your-product’ at distribution 
In addition to the duty of distributors to assess ‘suitability at product design’, as described above, 
regulators and supervisors need to provide an answer to the endemic problem of insufficient 
professional standards, in particular at distribution. There is abundant evidence that advisers and sales 
representatives fail to understand the characteristics and risks of even relatively simple products 
(FSA, 2011b). The UK, for instance, has introduced policies to raise the level of the professional 
qualifications that sales representatives both in advised and non-advised sales should meet. It has also 
introduced continuous professional development programmes of at least 35 hours per year, so that 
sales representatives are kept up-to-date with market innovations. At EU level there is so far no 
common approach except the one proposed by ESMA (2011), which is based on supervisory 
coordination. If required by national regulations, professional training is typically done by national 
bodies and no harmonised approach to training currently exists, while financial advice is ‘passported’ 
at EU level (through MiFID rules).  
Finally, with suitability being applied at product design with regard to the characteristics and needs of 
the targeted investors, the duty should apply to originators independently of the distribution channel 
through which the product is finally delivered to the end investor. Distributor and originator shall be 
jointly liable if the product is unsuitable at its design for end investors. This would impose a duty on 
the distributor to evaluate the suitability of the product structure before the product is put on sale for 
non-professional investors. 
2.2 Disclosure requirements 
2.2.1 Basic principles of disclosure  
Comprehensive and not misleading disclosure plays an essential role in markets where information 
asymmetries are prevalent, such as the market for retail investment products. Without disclosure, 
investors would not be able to make informed investment decisions. In this context, imposing 
disclosure requirements via public intervention serves two objectives:  
i) It reduces the costs involved in gathering and understanding information to promote investor 
participation by providing complete and not misleading information; and  
ii) It facilitates comparisons across products and services to facilitate the best choice and stimulate 
competition. Public intervention would therefore be justified by the difficulties in processing 
abundant and complex information and the susceptibility of investors to framing by 
intermediaries, thereby reducing ex ante the likelihood of misselling practices.9  
For retail investors, in particular, three types of disclosure requirements are relevant in financial 
markets. A first-order disclosure pertains to the nature and characteristics of the products and services 
before the sale and during the execution of the contract (ongoing disclosure). This first-order 
disclosure reduces the likelihood of misselling and most importantly, the risk of fuelling adverse 
selection, i.e. the systematic inability to assess the quality of a product ex ante, which would end up 
pushing high-quality products out of the market (at least products for retail investors; Akerlof, 1970). 
Pre-contractual and ongoing disclosure also ensure that investors can evaluate performance, at least 
for those characteristics of the product that so allow (non-credence attributes). It therefore helps to 
create a reputational market for investment products. Often, market dynamics in Europe have been 
driven by the degree of accessibility to distribution channels rather than the reputation of originators 
in delivering returns to final (retail) investors. A second-order disclosure, instead, would address any 
conflict of interest that cannot be eliminated and need therefore to be disclosed to the client and the 
market. Both first- and second-order information are relevant to individual investment decisions and 
                                                   
9 From the perspective of behavioural economics, the costs of being rational are high given the need to acquire 
and process information (De Meza et al., 2008, p. 20). 
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to determine the adherence of the intermediary to its fiduciary duty. This paper focuses on first-order 
disclosure only. 
2.2.1.1 Four-step approach to investor disclosure 
To achieve the two objectives above, regulation can use a four-step approach to the problem, in 
particular through:  
i) High-level principles, such as “disclosure should be comprehensive and not misleading”, while 
“any information should be communicated in a concise and clear manner”;  
ii) Standardisation of the disclosed content, i.e. the categories of information that the intermediary 
should disclose to the investor;  
iii) Standardisation of the form of disclosure, with reference to the presentation of disclosure, in 
particular for summary disclosure; and  
iv) Disclosure of the procedures to follow in order to obtain more information, file complaints and 
obtain redress.  
In addition, financial education and generic advice can be helpful in informing investors about how 
information should ultimately be read and utilised.  
Standardisation presents a number of trade-offs, since it may misrepresent the nature of risks in 
certain products, lose pace with market developments, induce ‘moral licensing’ in intermediaries or 
even inhibit the disclosure of relevant risks if they do not fit within the given format. However, 
standardisation appears as a necessary tool to ensure that investors can access some form of summary 
disclosure that is comparable across products and intermediaries. Enough flexibility is needed so that 
intermediaries are given the room to disclose all relevant information, even in summary documents. 
Notably, however, standardisation should not be allowed to remove liability for incomplete, incorrect 
or misleading information.  
The next sections examine the current framework for pre-contractual, ongoing and post-trade 
disclosure in the EU and make some policy proposals. 
2.2.2 A framework for disclosure requirements 
This section assesses two levels of disclosure currently present in the regulation governing the 
provision of financial services and products: pre-contractual and ongoing disclosure. This section does 
not deal with pre-trade or post-trade market transparency (e.g. price and volumes) of instruments 
listed on legally-recognised trading platforms for trading purposes.10 
2.2.2.1 Pre-contractual 
Pre-contractual information plays a central role in retail contracts, where the terms and conditions are 
set ex ante and the consumer has little or no bargaining power. In many jurisdictions, pre-contractual 
information is incorporated into the contract and may take precedence over formal terms and 
conditions in the interest of the consumer. Beyond the rights potentially conferred on the consumer, 
pre-contractual information plays an essential economic role, mitigating asymmetries of information 
and facilitating choice. There would be no markets without pre-contractual information, and even 
more so for limit order books of some plain vanilla financial instruments (such as shares), which bring 
together all sorts of buying and selling interests. Most notably, in particular when dealing with 
credence goods, the absence of any ex-ante way to signal the level of risk embedded in a financial 
product would increase distortions in its pricing, as fewer investors will be able to have even a partial 
evaluation of the product ex ante. High-quality products would therefore be increasingly mispriced 
and pushed out of the market. 
                                                   
10 For an overview of the theoretical background behind pre and post-trade transparency requirements for 
trading, please see Valiante (2011). 
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In the market for investment products, when dealing with retail investors, the importance of pre-
contractual information is even more acute, given the complexity of the products on sale and the 
importance of individual investment decisions. The effectiveness of disclosure therefore also depends 
crucially on its length and form, which can expose investors to framing and information overflow. 
The full disclosure of every legal term, which is not necessarily relevant for understanding the risk-
reward profile, has proved counterproductive because of its length and complexity. Instead, evidence 
suggests that summary disclosure in plain language is effective in helping investors to make better 
investment decisions (Chater et al., 2010).11 From a behavioural perspective, disclosure fosters the 
feeling of ownership over the investment decision, with positive effects for instance where it comes to 
coping with intermediary losses (NEST, 2010). The hard task is to ensure that content selection keeps 
the underlying bulk of information conveyed to the investor complete and not misleading, in order for 
him/her to take an informed and smooth investment decision. Most notably, the level of pre-
contractual details to be disclosed also depends on the level of complexity in product structuring. 
Plain vanilla products, such as shares and short-term bullet bonds, may require a less complex 
regulatory approach. Packaged products, such as units of investment funds or derivatives, may require 
a different level of information disclosure in the pre-contractual phase.  
2.2.2.1.1 The ‘KID’ format and non-market risks 
The European Commission has proposed the creation of a standard for pre-contractual disclosure, 
which is called the key information document (KID), under a regulation put forward by the European 
Commission in July 2012.12 The document is based on two principles:  
i) Selective content, of short length and clear language to facilitate understanding and get the most 
important information across; and  
ii) Standardised layout, risk, cost and performance indicators to facilitate comparison and choice.  
Originators draft the document and distributors provide it to clients in advance of their purchases. The 
obligation to provide a KID would apply to so-called ‘packaged retail investment products’ or PRIPs, 
i.e. packaged products such as units of investment funds, unit-linked insurance and other packaged 
products.13 It is this element of ‘packaging’ that adds a further layer of complexity and necessitates a 
particular standard of disclosure, both in terms of risks and costs. A similar initiative could apply to 
equities and bonds to facilitate comparability of investment decisions.14 The proposed KID builds 
upon the experience gathered in UCITS, where a similar standard has operated since July 2011.15 But 
crucially the aim of the KID is not only to allow a comparison among products of the same category 
(e.g. between fund A and fund B) but also between different categories of products (e.g. between fund 
A and unit-linked insurance C). Fostering comparability across different types of packaged financial 
products is crucial since most of these products may appear as close substitutes from the viewpoint of 
the final investor. But disclosure should also help investors identify the characteristics that 
differentiate one product category from another.  
                                                   
11 In a survey conducted in 2011 by the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), 60% of the respondents said 
they read the key features document (KFD) in full or in part, while 80% said the document helped them in 
decision making. Almost 30% of individuals, however, said they did not receive the document or could not 
recall the reception (FSA, 2011a). The KFD is similar to the key information document (KID) proposed by the 
European Commission (2012) for PRIPs. 
12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Key Information Documents for 
Investment Products, COM (2012) 352/0169, 3 July 2012, European Commission, Brussels. 
13 For a full definition of the field of application of the KID, see De Manuel (2012). 
14 Equities and bonds, however, are subject to the prospectus Directive (2010/73/EC). 
15 Key investor information document or KIID under Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 of 1 July 2010 
implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards key investor 
information and conditions to be met when providing key investor information or the prospectus in a durable 
medium other than paper or by means of a website. 
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Most importantly, disclosing non-market risks appears as an essential element in this respect. Non-
market risks may be defined as those that do not depend on market developments such as changes in 
the value of the underlying assets, currencies or interest rates. They arise on average at a lower 
frequency but with a higher impact than market risks and are more difficult to measure and represent. 
Operational, counterparty and liquidity risks are some examples (De Manuel, 2012a). Non-market 
risks appear as one of the defining characteristics to distinguish different categories of PRIPs. For 
instance, an investment fund and other packaged products are not equivalent even if based on the 
performance of the same underlying. In a traditional investment fund, the end investor holds the 
beneficial ownership over the underlying assets, which need to be segregated and placed under the 
purview of an independent entity (depositary). In a packaged product, offering the return of the same 
reference assets, the investor will not hold ownership over any assets, which the originator may or 
may not hold, confounded in its balance sheet. In the first case, the investor is primarily exposed to 
the market risk of the underlying assets, while in the second case it also faces the risk of default of the 
product provider. At the same time, non-market risks are also defining features within each category 
of PRIPs. For instance, investment funds may employ derivative financial instruments or engage in 
practices, such as securities lending, that result in specific non-market risks.  
Pre-contractual disclosure has so far given insufficient attention to non-market risks. While UCITS 
are required to disclose in the key investor information document (KIID), it is uncertain to what extent 
disclosure takes place in practice – the obligation depends on the materiality of the risk but little 
specific guidance exists in this respect.16 Disclosure focuses instead on the summary risk-reward 
indicator, which considers only market risks. The proposal of the European Commission to introduce 
a key information document (KID) for PRIPs follows a similar approach, by requiring “warnings in 
relation to specific risks not fully reflected in the summary indicator”.17 Narrative disclosure or 
warnings alone, however, are unlikely to facilitate comparison between different products. To achieve 
comparability, the level of non-market risks would need to be rated and possibly graphically 
represented. A synthetic indicator for non-market risks would need to be based on a thorough 
categorisation of risks (such as counterparty risks), as well as the practices where they arise. In the 
absence of such disclosure, however, it is also difficult to imagine how an informed investment 
decision would be made. 
2.2.2.2 Ongoing 
Ongoing disclosure appears as important as pre-contractual information, and it becomes even more 
important the longer the investment horizon. It has two main functions: i) to keep the investor 
informed of returns and charges, helping inter alia to spur competition among providers and reduce 
switching costs; and ii) to inform the investor of material changes to the product (e.g. changes to the 
investment policy), providing the knowledge and the opportunity to exit. In contrast with the KID, no 
holistic approach has been put forward to date for ongoing disclosure in the European Union. Instead, 
there is regulatory fragmentation and limited harmonisation – as illustrated by the table below. 
Unregulated products face no specific requirements. A common approach to ongoing disclosure may 
strengthen investor protection, by facilitating understanding and consolidating the rules for marketing 
of packaged financial products. 
  
                                                   
16 Art. 8.5 Commission Regulation 583/2010. 
17 Art. 8.2.e COM (2012) 352/3. 
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Table 3. Selected EU legislation specifying ongoing product disclosure to investors  
UCITS  ­ Review and revision of the key investor information documenta  
­ Information in the event of a merger of UCITSb  
­ Information in the event of a non-feeder UCITS becoming a feeder UCITSc  
AIFMD ­ Disclosure of material changes to investorsd 
­ Disclosure of special liquidity and redemption arrangementse  
­ Regular disclosure of leveragef 
IORP  ­ Information to be given to members and beneficiaries on a yearly basisg  
  
a Chapter V, Section 6, Regulation 583/2010. 
b Article 43, Directive 2009/65/EC. 
c Article 64, Directive 2009/65/EC. 
d Article 23.1, Directive 2004/39/EC (prescribing a non-exhaustive list of matters). 
e Article 23. 4, Directive 2004/39/EC. 
f Article 23.5 in Directive 2004/39/EC. 
g Article 11, Directive 2003/41/EC (prescribing the detail of the information to be given yearly). 
 
In devising a regulatory framework for ongoing disclosure, a key task would be the division of 
responsibilities between distributors (service disclosure) and originators (product disclosure), so as to 
ensure the quality and integrity of the information while avoiding duplication of efforts. With respect 
to reporting to clients, EU regulation (MiFID II) requires firms to communicate periodically to clients, 
taking into account the type and complexity of the financial instruments involved and the nature of the 
service provided (see table below).18 It also introduces the notion of ‘ongoing disclosure’ for financial 
instruments, perhaps based on the realisation that over time some investment products may evolve in 
a manner that could make them unsuitable for individual investors.19 
Table 4. Ongoing reporting to clients in European legislation 
MiFID II 
 
Article 25.6 (reporting to clients) in Directive 2014/65 for investment services: 
“The investment firm shall provide the client with adequate reports on the service provided in a 
durable medium. Those reports shall include periodic communications to clients, taking into account 
the type and the complexity of financial instruments involved and the nature of the service provided to 
the client and shall include, where applicable, the costs associated with the transactions and services 
undertaken on behalf of the client.” 
IMD 2 Article 25.4 (reporting to customers) in legislative proposal COM (2012) 360 final, replicating Art. 25.5 in 
MiFID II above for insurance products. 
 
However, these provisions are general and their interpretation may be loose. There is no guidance as 
to the categories of services/instruments demanding periodic communication or the content of such 
communication to investors, nor whether the provider of the packaged product or advice should 
provide an ongoing assessment of its suitability and appropriateness. Moreover, the parties are free to 
contract or not an ongoing assessment of suitability, since such a service is not always helpful or 
affordable. Ongoing assessment of suitability and appropriateness may be particularly needed for 
                                                   
18 See also Art. 24.4 MiFID 2, 2014/65: “Appropriate information shall be provided in good time to clients or 
potential clients with regard to the investment firm and its services, the financial instruments and proposed 
investment strategies, execution venues and all costs and related charges.” 
19 Art. 24.3 first indent, legislative proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFID 2): “[...] when investment advice is 
provided, information shall specify whether [...] the investment firm will provide the client with the on-going 
assessment of the suitability of the financial instruments recommended.” 
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long-term investments, precisely because of their long-term horizon. In the UK, for instance, 60% of 
purchasers of long-term products were offered ongoing advice (FSA, 2011a).  
Finally, ongoing disclosure may also include, for packaged financial products, periodic disclosure of 
cost-return performance in a format that allows comparison and, if equivalent, standardised 
benchmarking with alternative investment products by the client herself or by his/her advisor. These 
requirements would potentially promote reputational mechanisms and help the consolidation of the 
retail investment management industry, especially in Europe, where the sector is particularly 
fragmented due to high legal and fiscal barriers between member states. With no regulatory 
framework, there is no incentive for bad performers to disclose this information, and good performers 
(if confident enough about their performance over a long period) will not find bad products to 
benchmark their products against.  
2.3 ‘Know-your-customer’ and ‘know-the-security’ rules 
2.3.1 Basic principles 
While disclosure is a necessary condition for any transaction, it is not sufficient to ensure proper 
investor protection. Financial capability and behavioural biases (mentioned above), on top of potential 
conflicts of interests that the investment service providers might have, ultimately limit the 
effectiveness of disclosure. In effect, customer testing has shown that a significant share of retail 
investors have difficulties in understanding relatively simple financial concepts and arithmetic 
operations also used in the KID (IFF Research and YouGov, 2009). In addition, when investors 
struggle to understand one or two terms, they are not able to recognise their relevance and feel 
discouraged as to their overall level of understanding. Face-to-face intermediation can help investors 
to partially overcome some of their cognitive and behavioural limitations. An overwhelming majority 
of retail investments are undertaken in the context of face-to-face intermediation – approximately 
80% in the EU (Chater et al., 2010) and over 75% in the UK (FSA, 2011a). Investor surveys suggest 
that roughly 60% of investor decisions follow the recommendation of the intermediary and only a 
quarter of investors make their choice entirely on their own (Chater et al., 2010; FSA, 2011a).  
In the context of face-to-face intermediation, however, the investor is particularly exposed to framing 
and persuasion by the intermediary.20 It is therefore essential that the interests of investor and 
intermediary are aligned. EU legislation imposes a fiduciary duty on investment firms to act 
“honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of the client”.21 This duty 
demands the intermediary to refrain from exploiting the information asymmetries and behavioural 
biases affecting its client. It rejects the principle ‘caveat emptor’ prevalent in traditional contract law 
(Engel & McCoy, 2002). This approach to investor protection is also recognised in US securities 
regulation. The ‘shingle’ theory, developed in 1939, provides the general clause of acting in a fair way 
                                                   
20 A large number of framing techniques can be employed at the point of sale, including for instance: 
- The dilution of relevant information to divert the attention of the investor (e.g. “[...] and on the back of the 
document you can find all the conditions and charges; I think it is an ideal product to save for your holidays, 
are you planning something special?”); 
- The use of anchors to manage investors’ expectations (e.g. “returns in the current environment are low, less 
than 2% [...] product X offers 3% return”); 
- The use of complex cost or return structures that are difficult to understand and compare, steering the 
investor towards a decision based on branding (e.g. “our star product ‘Step-Up Opportunity’ guarantees a 
rate of return that grows every six months until maturity”); 
- Sequencing information to exploit the tendency to give more weight to the aspects mentioned immediately 
before making the decision; and 
- Playing on the individual’s optimistic nature and confirmatory bias (e.g. “if you feel prices will rebound, you 
should follow your instinct”). 
21 Art. 19.1, Directive 2004/39/CE (MiFID). 
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and according to professional standards when the broker puts out his shingle to market his services, 
whether or not the investor has an agency relationship with the investment firm (Wartman, 1978). 
Over the years, the shingle theory has evolved to include a fiduciary duty in case the actions of the 
investment firm (e.g. a broker), even if not immediately related to a client transaction, were ultimately 
not in the best interest of the agency relationship the firm had with its clients (Karmel, 1995).22 This 
evolution in legal theory and case law, supported by the shingle theory, has allowed the application of 
economic theories for practices in the sale of financial instruments (Madison, 1999), in particular 
when there is investment advice (see Hughes vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1949,23 in 
Leavell, 1967). The provision of investment advice in the sale of financial instruments has led the 
provider over the years to test the ‘suitability’ of the advice for the investment decision (‘know-your-
customer’ rules). For ‘non-advised’ sales, however, the provider of information about the sale would 
not conduct the suitability test, but for instance in the EU, he/she has to assess the ‘appropriateness’ of 
the financial instrument (‘know-the-security’ rules), based on the knowledge and expertise of the 
investor to understand the risks of the transaction. 
2.3.2 A regulatory framework for sales practices: The MiFID experience 
Investor protection at the point of sale is an important instrument to boost competition in the 
distribution of financial instruments. The effect of investor protection rules on competition among 
product providers and distributors, however, is not straightforward and depends on how the rules are 
devised. The experience in the United Kingdom prior to 2005 illustrates this point well. Advisers 
could either advise on products across the market (‘independent’ advice) or represent one company 
and sell only its products (‘tied’ advice). The rules were aimed at simplifying the market and 
clarifying the attribution of responsibilities to reduce misselling. However, competition did not 
improve much, as investors failed to shop around and compare the products offered by different tied 
advisers. In 2005, the market was ‘depolarised’ and the rule that prohibited tied agents from selling 
third-party products was abolished (FSA, 2002; FSA, 2008). In devising investor protection rules, 
policy-makers should therefore be mindful of their impact on competition. Furthermore, investor 
protection in the sale of financial instruments can also impact the distribution of savings across 
different solutions and even increase the level of participation of retail investors in financial markets, 
potentially leading to a higher savings rate with wider economic effects on investments and growth.  
 The EU legislative framework differentiates between advised and non-advised sales. Investment 
advice is defined by the European MiFID legislation as the provision of a ‘personal recommendation’, 
with elements of ‘opinion’, to a client in respect of one or more transactions in financial instruments 
(CESR, 2010).24 When providing such a recommendation, the firm has to ensure that the 
recommended transaction is suitable for the client, with reference to his or her investment objectives 
and ability to bear financially the risks involved in the transaction. When no personal recommendation 
is provided, the firm only needs to ensure that the client has the experience and knowledge to 
understand the risks in the transaction (appropriateness test). MiFID also provides an opt-out clause 
from non-advised sales tests for non-complex financial products, such as shares, thereby exempting 
investment firms from applying any test (‘execution-only’ clause). This clause relies on the 
assumption that the simple structuring of some financial products (listed in the Directive) makes them 
broadly suitable for any retail investor, who can assess himself or herself the suitability of the product 
on the basis of their own situation.  
 
                                                   
22 For more information about the early development of agency and fiduciary relationships and theories for 
investment firms, see Lesh (1946, p. 1237). 
23 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit; 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
24 Art. 4.1.4 Directive 2004/39/EC, Art. 52 Directive 2006/73/EC and CESR/10-293. 
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Table 5. Overview of the regulatory framework for sale practices in MiFID I 
Service Details Assessment Information 
Advised sales Personal 
recommendation a  
Suitability - The recommendation meets the client’s 
investment objectives  
- The client is able financially to bear the 
investment risk  
- The client has the experience and knowledge to 
understand the risks in the transactionb  
Non-advised sales Information 
collection 
Appropriateness - The client has the experience and knowledge to 
understand the risks in the transaction c 
Execution-only 
sales 
Execution None - Only for products classified as non-complex by 
MiFID, if at the initiative of the client who is 
warned about the risksd  
    
a For a more detailed definition of advice under MiFID, please see CESR (2010). 
b Art. 35 Directive 2006/73/EC (implementing MiFID I). 
cArt. 36 Directive 2006/73/EC (implementing MiFID I). 
d Art. 19.6 Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID I), including shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, money market instruments, bonds 
or other forms of securitised debt (except if they embed a derivative) and UCITS. 
 
The distinction between advised and non-advised sales relies on the definition of ‘personal 
recommendation’, i.e. on the ability of the investor and the supervisor to distinguish between 
information that contains an element of opinion from neutral information that does not exploit any of 
the several biases that affect investors’ decision-making, especially when the relationship between 
distributor and investors transpires in a bilateral environment with oral agreements. The definition 
therefore appears weak on several fronts. In effect, the consistency of the current framework (see 
Table 5) is impaired in practice by:  
i) The difficulty for investors to distinguish a personal recommendation from general information, 
and  
ii) The ability of the intermediary to provide a personal recommendation orally without any 
assessment of suitability and, under poor recoding practices, formally classify the transaction as a 
non-advised sale or if the product is eligible, as an execution-only service.  
There is indeed evidence that intermediaries sometimes evade their responsibilities by inducing 
confusion in investors about the sale process (ESMA, 2011). 
In addition, the directive fails to acknowledge that any assessment of suitability is contingent on the 
characteristics of the service provided, including the range of instruments considered, the level of 
expertise and the remuneration of the intermediary. In this sense, a distributor only offering a narrow 
sample of instruments from a restricted set of product providers will ordinarily be unable to compare 
costs and other relevant features in the risk-return profile of the investment. Similarly, a distributor 
with insufficient expertise may not have enough understanding of the products offered to carry a 
meaningful suitability assessment. And the structure of remuneration may embed incentives to sell 
products with a higher margin, even if unsuitable for the individual investor. There is abundant 
evidence of all three of these respects.25 Most notably, due to is definition, it is possible under EU 
legislation to consider a piece of advice from a distributor that offers a limited range of financial 
instruments and comparability as a ‘personal recommendation’, rather than just pre-sale information, 
and its compensation is affected by the monetary and non-monetary inducements of the provider. 
                                                   
25 See ESMA (2011), AMF (2012), Synovate (2011), FSA (2007), FSA (2010a), FSA (2011a) and De Manuel 
(2012b). 
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MIFID I did not address any of these three respects. It attempted to limit the inducements paid by 
originators to distributors but it did not achieve this partial objective either. The directive prohibits 
inducements but grants an exemption based on three conditions (Art. 26, Impl. Dir. MiFID I): 
i) They are designed to improve the quality of the service to the client; 
ii) They do not impair the ability of the firm to comply with its duty to act honestly, fairly and in the 
best interest of its clients; and  
iii) They are appropriately disclosed. 
By granting such a wide margin for interpretation to investment firms on a case-by-case basis, the 
prohibition of inducements is stripped of its meaning,26 with the result that a large number of firms 
have not altered their behaviour following the introduction of MiFID.27 The regulator assumes that 
there might be unbiased advice even if the distributor receives a commission for suggesting one 
product rather than another and fails to provide a transparent framework for investors to be able to 
discriminate among different sale and ‘advice’ services.28 
2.3.2.1 The new EU proposal for investment advice 
In light of several misselling cases across Europe related to advised sales in particular, the European 
Commission proposed in 2011 a reform of MiFID that formally introduces a new category of advice, 
so-called ‘independent advice’. This ‘independent’ advice would need to fulfil two conditions. The 
advisor must:  
i) Assess a sufficiently large number of financial instruments; and  
ii) Not receive any monetary benefits from any party other than the investor.29  
In addition, investment firms would have to inform clients as to whether their advice is provided on 
an independent basis and whether it is based on a broad or on a more restricted analysis of the 
market.30 
The proposal has some merit in acknowledging that not all services falling under the legal definition 
of investment advice are the same. But it only addresses inducements, and it does not consider the 
biases created by training and professional standards. In effect, even absent inducements from 
originators, any distributor may set a remuneration policy for its sales force that may be incompatible 
with their fiduciary duty towards investors, i.e. by pushing unnecessary sales or portfolio rotations for 
the investor due to the fees and indirect benefits that these operations generate (so-called ‘churning’). 
                                                   
26 Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC prohibits investment firms from providing or receiving any inducements 
(monetary or otherwise). However, inducements are allowed if they satisfy three requirements: (Art. 26). This 
test puts the weight on the individual self-assessment by firms of each inducement on a case-by-case basis 
(CESR/10-295, p. 18). Implementation at EU level has followed a soft-approach based on interpretative 
guidelines and a market survey for firms to “benchmark themselves against industry compliance practices” 
(CESR/10-295, p. 5).  
27 “These requirements have not always proven to be very clear or well articulated for investors and their 
application has created some practical difficulties and some concerns.” – European Commission SEC (2011) 
1226 final (impact assessment MiFID 2), p. 16. “CESR [ESMA] acknowledges that the application of the test 
might not always be straightforward” – ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 22. “Most of the 
investment firms sampled said that they assess payments and non-monetary benefits they provide or receive for 
compliance with the MiFID inducements rules” – ESMA Report, CESR/10-295 (inducements, MiFID), p. 8. 
Research has shown that a very small number of advisers disclose inducements and other conflicts of interest to 
clients – Synovate (2011, p. 9). See also AMF (2012). 
28 “For the purposes of the provisions of this Directive concerning inducements, the receipt by an investment 
firm of a commission in connection with investment advice or general recommendations, in circumstances 
where the advice or recommendations are not biased as a result of the receipt of commission, should be 
considered as designed to enhance the quality of the investment advice to the client” (Recital 39, Impl. Dir. 
MiFID I). 
29 Art. 24.5, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFIDII). 
30 Art. 43.3, Legislative Proposal COM (2011) 656 final (MiFIDII). 
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At the same time, by failing to set minimum entry requirements to the profession, there is little to 
warrant that advisers and sales staff can cope with growing complexity and innovation in financial 
instruments. 
The proposal also relies on the assumption that investors can understand and price “independent” 
versus “non-independent” advice. This situation may not create incentives for distributors and third 
party advisers to describe themselves as ‘independent’ and to cease receiving inducements, which the 
impact assessment accompanying the Commission’s proposal mentions as a “significant possibility” 
(European Commission, 2011a, p. 68, 193 and 258).  
In effect, the distinction between independent advice and other ‘advice’ services is not straightforward 
for investors. For instance in the UK, despite independent advice being more prevalent than elsewhere 
in Europe, a large proportion of retail investors misunderstand the concept of independent advice. 
Over 40% of individuals who had recently purchased an investment product or had requested advice 
failed to label correctly the service received. Even more worryingly, 65% of recent purchasers who 
had received non-independent advice believed they had contacted an independent financial adviser, 
known in the UK under the acronym IFA (FSA, 2011a).  
2.3.3 Is a new approach to investment advice possible? 
The difficulty to apply a tout court prohibition of inducements (whether monetary or non-monetary) 
when providing advice, on top of the complexity to distinguish between ‘advised’ and ‘non-advised’ 
sale (i.e. when a ‘personal recommendation’ is provided), may call for a net separation between 
advisory services and pre-sale information services in non-advised sales. This approach to investment 
advice would keep both distribution channels based on biased (by monetary and non-monetary 
compensation) and unbiased advice, but with a more coherent separation.  
The problems enumerated in the previous sections suggest that the regulatory framework for sale 
practices, while formally constraining investment firms, may require additional focus. Arguably, a 
new regime for selling practices should seek to achieve three objectives:  
i) Improve the quality of advice by addressing the level expertise, conflicts of interest in 
remuneration and market coverage;  
ii) Clearly separate advised from non-advised sales, reducing confusion for investors; and  
iii) Ensure proportionate access to advice, including for low-income and non-urban areas.  
Advised sales should be clearly separated from other services. In an occasional oral exchange between 
the intermediary at the front desk and a small investor, it is relatively easy for an intermediary to give 
a personal recommendation to a client without assessing suitability first. Monitoring costs would be 
high as well, as recording conversations is not feasible in the context of face-to-face intermediation 
and therefore sales agents may classify actual advised sales as non-advised with relative ease. 
Insufficient awareness among investors as to the process of delivering and receiving advice also 
facilitates circumvention. Regulation is largely responsible for this confusion since it sets a distorted 
definition of regulated ‘advice’ that includes personal recommendations delivered by tied sales agents.  
On top of abilities to circumvent suitability requirements, and since face-to-face intermediation is still 
one of the key distribution channels, investment advice should be more narrowly defined. The current 
definition of advice rests on false assumptions that the suitability test would ensure that any personal 
recommendation will be in the best interest of the client (whether or not it is based on inducements) 
and that no personal recommendation would be given in the context of face-to-face intermediation 
without first assessing suitability. Those assumptions do not hold in practice; there is sufficient 
evidence showing that the suitability test is misapplied in practice, resulting in unsuitable 
recommendations in roughly half the cases, and the intermediaries can easily induce confusion in 
clients to avoid assessing suitability.31 Regulation should acknowledge that the results of applying the 
                                                   
31 See ESMA (2011), AMF (2012), Synovate (2011), FSA (2007), FSA (2010a), FSA (2011a) and De Manuel 
(2012b). 
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suitability test are contingent on remuneration practices and market coverage and circumvention of 
the suitability test can only be mitigated by clearly differentiating advice. No regulatory test can 
uphold investor interest in the presence of inducements by originators or narrow market coverage. 
Genuine advice requires both remuneration practices that are free of conflicts of interest and the 
consideration of a reasonably broad pool of products and providers. 
Advised vs. non-advised sales should be separated in a manner that is directly apprehensible by the 
investor and the distinction ‘independent’ vs. ‘restricted’ may not be easy to understand as long as it is 
considered ‘advice’ after all and not a tied sale. The denomination of ‘investment advice’ shall 
therefore be reserved for personal recommendations where the adviser accepts no (monetary and non-
monetary) inducements and considers a reasonably broad range of products and providers vis-à-vis 
the investment objective of the client. All other sale services should be named ‘pre-sale information’ 
services and if personal recommendations are delivered, it should be considered by the client as pre-
sale information because it would not be considered (even if proved) as ‘advice’ by the authorities. It 
would work in the same way that the authorities obtain sales information from car dealers selling 
products from a predefined set of (or just one) car manufacturer(s). In effect, with or without a 
framework for advised sales, the investor will most likely receive a personal recommendation 
(whether captured or not by the suitability test in the advised sale regime) to buy the product that is 
offered by the distributor receiving benefits from the product originator. Advice should be recognised 
up front as a recommendation to buy something that is in the best interest of the client. If it is not in 
the best interest of the client because it is distorted by side benefits, it should be merely treated as pre-
sale information about the product to lure investors in.  
This legal demarcation between advised and non-advised sales would most likely boost the creation of 
a reputational market for pure investment advice. It would be the only way for investors to clearly 
distinguish advice from informational services, so in the end they can price the service by weighing 
the cost of a potentially more expensive (lower returns) and unsuitable financial product with the cost 
of an advised suitable product (with higher returns) plus an advisory fee. Even though it would not 
solve the underlying adverse selection problem with financial services, it may somehow be a way to 
signal the risk of moving into a lower quality service and contain the adverse selection (and inability 
to price quality) that reduces the possibility to find a higher quality (suitable) advice. The investor 
does not see a ‘measurable’ reason to pay for it and therefore it is mispriced. Following this 
separation, even if the investor is still unable to better distinguish between advice and pre-sale 
information services, there will certainly be more chances for him/her to know the possibility to 
access advice tailored around his/her best interest. 
Table 6. Separating ‘investment advice’ and ‘pre-sale information’ services 
Pre-sale information  Investment advice 
(Monetary and/or non-monetary) Inducements   No inducements 
Limited or broad range  
of products and providers  
Broad range of  
products and providers 
Revised appropriateness test  Revised suitability test 
Strict professional standards  Strict professional standards 
Full cost disclosure  Full cost disclosure 
 
Source: Authors. 
The ability to identify advice in the best interest of the client from other forms of biased 
recommendations may also be a way to promote more responsible investment decisions through, for 
instance, fiscal advantages by governments for those investors that actually request investment advice. 
Access to investment advice in the best interest of the client may also promote greater financial 
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education and understanding of investment objectives, as the advisor would set up a tailored path to 
identify the suitable investment. 
Suitability and appropriateness tests would need to be recast to reflect this segregation between 
regulated ‘advice’ and ‘pre-sale information’ services. The revised suitability test would pay specific 
attention to costs and fees, as a key element determining net returns for the investor and the execution 
of his or her investment objectives. In so doing, it should ensure that the advisor would pay due 
attention to comparing the (implicit and explicit) costs among similar products. The revised 
appropriateness test for pre-sale information services would consider, in addition to the clients’ 
expertise, his or her ability to bear the risk of losses – so as to reduce the scope for gross misselling of 
risky products to individuals with low income or little wealth.  
2.3.3.1 Other requirements for pre-sale and investment advice services 
Transparent categorisation and ex-ante disclosure of the conflict of interest may be insufficient to 
ensure the delivery of pre-sale information services in the best interest of clients. Some limits to 
inducements should also operate in the case of ‘pre-sale information’ services. For instance, the cost 
of distribution (paid today through inducements) shall be fixed at a company level by the distributor, 
who will charge the same cost to all providers, while access to the distribution network would need to 
be provided to all originators on fair commercial terms. Deviations from a fixed price, which could 
also be damaging to the competitive setting if distributors have oligopolistic market power in their 
specific segment, could be considered if the terms of the premium or discount are disclosed ex ante 
and applied in the same way to other originators. 
 Advice should be easily accessible to all individuals in a manner proportionate to their needs, given 
by their level of income and wealth. Individuals with low and moderate incomes will increasingly 
need investment advice, in particular to plan for retirement. It is therefore essential that access to 
advice is fostered irrespective of wealth or geographical location and, as long as advisors meet high-
quality professional standards, barriers to entry/exit for advisers are kept at a reasonably low level. 
The notion of ‘proportionate’ access recalls, however, that most investors need basic advice, in 
contrast to the sophisticated services used by more affluent investors. In order to ensure access to 
advice for low-income investors or those residing in remote geographical locations, universal service 
obligations could be envisaged to avoid financial exclusion. The concept of ‘basic advice’ would need 
to be defined in connection with elements such as the pension system provided in each member state, 
which may or may not include default or compulsory options. 
Remuneration should be aligned with the client’s interest, i.e. policies and practices should not set 
incentives to ‘push’ certain products or rotate portfolio composition without regard to the client’s best 
interest. The varying level of inducements paid by product originators to distributors is just one 
example where remuneration is not aligned with client interest. Beyond inducements, however, 
internal remuneration policies can also work against client interest, for instance by making 
disproportionate rewards conditional on achieving a specified number of sales.32 Legislation and 
supervisory guidelines can address these problems only partially.  
The professional standards of individuals selling financial instruments should be raised. Some 
member states have already imposed minimum entry qualifications and/or ongoing training 
requirements – notably the UK, Sweden and France. Yet, national rules can be ‘circumvented’ by 
‘passporting’ services from elsewhere in the EU – since professional qualifications are the 
competence of the home member state, employees in branches may not always comply with the 
requirements of the host country.33 This risk of circumvention, coupled with the lack of action by 
                                                   
32 For example, see ESMA 2012/570 Consultation Paper, Guideline on remuneration policies and practices 
(MiFID). 
33 Under Art. 13 Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID), organisational requirements are the competence of the home 
member state, which includes professional qualifications under Art. 5.1.d Directive 2006/73/EC (“to employ 
personnel with the skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities allocated to 
them”). For instance, a firm ‘passporting’ into the UK would not be subject to the FSA's requirements under its 
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most member states despite evidence of poor knowledge and expertise among agents, certainly calls 
for minimum requirements to be set at EU level.  
2.4 Is best execution the silver bullet? 
The general clause, which is common in securities regulation, obliging the investment firm to act in 
accordance with its clients’ best interest establishes a fiduciary duty between the firm and its clients. 
Building on the common law principles of agency relationship, this fiduciary duty is generally seen as 
a duty of best execution in the provision of investment services, which obviously falls on the provider. 
Even though this duty is explicitly stated in common law and US securities regulation, no details 
existed in US securities regulation on how and when it should be implemented (Macey & O’Hara, 
1997). Only with the entry into force of Regulation National Market System (NMS) in 2005, 34 was 
best execution for equities identified as the law of the best price across different trading platforms 
(represented by the National Best Bid and Offer), in addition to a prompt execution and on the 
appropriate venue (Poser & Fanto, 1997). Still, no details are specified in US securities regulation of 
how and when this duty should be exercised for other asset classes or more specifically for other 
investment services than reception and transmission of orders.  
In contrast, European securities regulation has gone farther in defining the circumstances in which the 
best execution duty applies, although precisely how the duty should be applied remains controversial 
(Valiante, 2011). The best execution obligation is complementary to the ‘know-your-product’ rules, 
‘know-your-customer’ rules and disclosure requirements mentioned in previous sections. MiFID 
applies the best execution duty to: execution of orders on behalf of clients, reception and transmission 
of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments and portfolio management. The investment 
firm would need to take “all reasonable steps” to obtain the best net result for the client, “taking into 
account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other 
consideration relevant for the execution of the order” (Art. 21, MiFID I). The scope of the duty is 
broad, which has raised questions about its actual implementation (Lannoo & Valiante, 2011; Assi & 
Valiante, 2011). Doubts also remain on the application of the duty for retail investors. In effect, best 
execution for retail investors is determined by ‘price and cost’ (Art. 44, Impl. Dir. MiFID I), but 
“where there is more than one competing venue” the “firm’s own commissions and costs for 
executing the order on each of the eligible execution venues shall be taken into account” (Art. 44.3, 
Impl. Dir. MiFID I). As commissions or costs of the link to an eligible trading venue are often at 
discretion of the parties (the broker and the execution venue), this clause may have left space for a 
less strict implementation of the retail best execution obligation. 
2.4.1 Best execution as a narrow ‘default rule’ 
Although investors may have different needs in the execution of the transaction, a broad selection of 
criteria to meet the best execution duty makes observability and verifiability of best execution more 
difficult, and so the enforcement of best execution policies too. A restricted definition (like the ‘best 
bid and offer’ obligation in the Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS), though, may reduce 
choice and concentrate competition only on direct trading costs, i.e. bid-ask spread on order books. 
An alternative solution would need to protect the investor’s choice by balancing discretion and 
customisation in the drafting of execution policies with a duty that is clearly observable and 
verifiable. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Training and Competence Sourcebook, which includes holding a relevant qualification and carrying out 
continuing professional development. Individuals operating in branches established in the UK may be subject, 
however, to the FSA’s Approved Persons Regime, which includes the Customer Controlled Function (CF30) 
where an individual is carrying out a retail distribution activity. This means that the FSA’s Statement of 
Principles and Code of Practice (APER) would apply to these individuals.  
34 Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-51808; File No. S7-10-04 
(www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf). 
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On top of access to trading data to assess the execution quality ex post, a balance between monitoring 
costs and investor choice can be achieved by using a ‘narrowed’ best execution duty as a ‘default rule’ 
for reception and transmission of orders, execution on behalf and portfolio management. The default 
rule would then leave the parties to agree on a bilateral basis an execution policy that would deviate 
from the ‘default’ and would include additional parameters agreed by the parties. The ‘narrow’ best 
execution can be defined as the obligation to execute the transaction at the best price available on 
legally classified trading venues at net of the explicit (fee) and implicit (bid-ask spread) costs that the 
venue will charge at that moment, calculated on a reasonable time frame (latency may not be 
necessarily high-frequency). The narrow best execution definition would perhaps capture the vast 
majority of investors’ preferences at execution, while leaving to the bilateral setting more 
sophisticated execution requirements, which can be used by some specialised professional investors. 
Bilateral negotiations, however, should not circumvent the default rule by agreeing on execution 
policies that offer less parameters than the default rule. Whether these additional parameters 
negotiated bilaterally will be priced in the execution costs, or rather internalised at no additional cost 
for the investor, would be left to the contractual power that the investor can actually exercise. 
Bilateral agreements would also leave to the bilateral negotiations the frequency of revision of 
execution policies. 
The implementation of this definition would also require greater comparability between the data 
produced by different trading venues and the harmonisation of data formats in order to reduce the 
costs of data and increase accessibility to pre-trade data. Overall, the restricted mandate for execution 
policies would also improve observability and verifiability, which are minimal informational 
requirements to define a contractual contingency (Hermalin et al., 2007). 
2.5 Complaint resolution and incentives  
A comprehensive approach to investor protection also requires a smooth complaint filing and 
resolution framework, which can boost a more effective private enforcement, especially if dealing 
with small misselling practices that have high monitoring costs from a centralised infrastructure. 
Private enforcement over the sale of financial instruments is very limited in Europe today, and only a 
few countries have a dedicated infrastructure that promotes private enforcement. Despite greater 
financial integration, therefore, the lack of a European consumer agency still reflects the piecemeal 
national approach to marketing of financial instruments and to remedies. A common European 
approach is paramount in the following areas: 
1) Complaint filings to national authorities and support into litigation  
2) Collective actions 
3) Sanctions  
4) Redress procedures  
Complaints filing is a primary source of private enforcement and allows investors to reach the 
authority before the litigation begins, opening the door for alternative settlement procedures that 
reduce costs for investors and increase their incentive to monitor providers. However, it also involves 
high implementing costs, which requires a dedicated infrastructure that can also provide support to the 
investors during the litigation. The introduction of collective action tools in several countries has 
begun to promote private enforcement, but activism is still limited (Civic Consulting, 2008; European 
Parliament, 2012; European Commission, 2013). 
Moreover, regulating the sale of financial instruments requires sanctions with a strong deterrence 
effect, as profits generated by wrongdoing in the trading or sale of financial instruments can be very 
high due to the network effects. In addition, in some cases when there is no ‘smoking gun’, the 
‘credence good’ nature of financial products makes the assessment of damages very complex, thereby 
discouraging reporting in the first place. In effect, the risk of long and costly court trials for the 
investor can reduce the incentives for small investors to report misselling practices and other 
wrongdoings. Private enforcement, therefore, must be complemented with an effective system of 
sanctions and out-of-court alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that can reduce costs of litigation 
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borne by the investor and the product provider. Sanctions are often small administrative fines. In an 
environment with high transaction costs to conduct litigation or other ADR (reflected in a higher 
probability that the wrongdoing remains undetected), punitive damages, such as treble damages, may 
discourage the use of bad practices on a large scale. However, it can generate wrong incentives, such 
as excessive litigation and it is less effective in addressing individual wrongdoings. In some extreme 
cases, criminal sanctions could be a necessary corollary to punitive monetary sanctions. In an 
environment where the transaction cost for litigation or ADR is low, which is then reflected in a 
higher probability that the wrongdoing is detected (because for instance the local financial authority 
has put in place an effective financial ombudsman service), ADR systems might be more effective for 
the end investor and less costly for every actor involved (European Commission, 2011b). However, if 
investors’ access to private enforcement tools is too cheap, the ‘credence good’ nature of financial 
products may increase the probability of unnecessary litigation and also costs for the system. A 
comprehensive approach would need to balance accessibility to private enforcement with a proper 
complaint selection mechanism. 
2.5.1 What role for investor redress? 
Given thus the difficulties to observe and benchmark performance for the individuals themselves and 
then to report wrongdoing to the authorities, strong private enforcement is needed to ensure 
compliance. Investors redress refers to the enforcement of investor rights, either by means of 
injunctive relief (the cessation of an illegal activity) or compensation (the award of damages for harm 
caused). Redress may arise both from private or public enforcement but is conceptually different from 
the repression of unlawful behaviour, typically through punitive fines imposed through administrative 
or criminal proceedings.35 
The enforceability of rights by investors is central to the effectiveness of any investor protection 
framework. Indeed, no right is effective unless it can be enforced, by means of accessible, affordable 
and expedient procedures. Intermediaries would have few incentives to comply with legislation and 
act in the best interest of investors unless credible enforcement mechanisms would exist. At least four 
elements configure an effective framework for investor redress: i) a transparent channel for customer 
complaints, managed internally by the intermediary, ii) an efficient mechanism for out-of-court 
dispute resolution, iii) access to judicial review and to traditional civil litigation; and iv) effective 
integration of the former three elements with public enforcement, notably by financial supervisors. 
The markets in financial instruments Directive (MiFID) establishes that investment firms should 
maintain effective and transparent procedures for the reasonable and prompt handling of complaints 
received from retail clients, and to keep a record of each complaint and the measures taken for its 
resolution (Art. 10, implementing directive). The effectiveness of internal complaint handling depends 
on its quality and supervision. Firms should be required to communicate clearly to clients how to file 
internal complaints and be accountable to minimum standards of reasonable process and handling 
times. Moreover, they should also provide aggregate information on complaint handling to their 
supervisor.  
Investors would typically need to first file an internal complaint before seeking recourse to any 
mechanism for out-of-court dispute resolution. MiFID I only ‘encourages’ Member States to set up 
redress procedures for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes concerning the provision of 
services by investment firms (Art. 53).36 However, the proposed revision of MiFID I will require 
firms to join a scheme for the alternative resolution of consumer disputes, meaning that such schemes 
                                                   
35 In other words, the objective of redress is the provision of relief directly to the investor, in his or her own 
interest, rather than punishing the firm. Yet, in some jurisdictions, notably in the US, investor redress can lead to 
the award of punitive damages in excess of the harm caused – a phenomenon explained, partially at least, by 
weak public enforcement. EU law rejects punitive damages with the intention of allocating repressive objectives 
solely to public enforcement and avoiding the potential for double punishment (Commission Recommendation 
2013/396/EU). 
36 A strict obligation will be in place from July 2015 in accordance with Directive 2013/11/EU. 
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will have binding jurisdiction over service providers. It will depend on Member States whether such 
schemes will be endowed with the power to deliver binding decisions on any of the parties. For 
example, the decisions of the Financial Ombudsman Service of the United Kingdom are binding on 
service providers. 
The change introduced by MiFID II follows the adoption of Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), which creates an obligation for Member States to provide full ADR 
coverage at EU level, including for financial services, and provides a set of quality criteria regarding 
the effectiveness, fairness, independence and transparency of ADR. It also obliges firms to inform 
consumers about ADR. The 2013 ADR Directive covers all non-judicial procedures, such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, aimed at settling disputes between parties through the 
intervention of a neutral entity. It is complemented by Regulation 524/2013 on consumer online 
dispute resolution (ODR) setting up a single online platform for investors to access ADR throughout 
the EU.37 
While investors need to have access to judicial review of ADR process, the grounds of review should 
be limited in order to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the ADR process. In any event, non-
judicial mechanisms should remain as an ‘alternative’ to a fair trial by a court of justice, in line with 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 47).38 The judicial systems should, in addition, provide a 
satisfactory channel for collective claims, in order to facilitate access to justice (notably for small 
claims), achieve procedural economies (in instances of mass harm) and promote fuller enforcement. 
Recommendation 2013/396/EU on collective redress sets out a number of principles with respect to 
comparable collective actions in the EU. The choice of legal instrument, however, represents only a 
first step in this process.  
3. Conclusions 
Origination, distribution and sale of financial products are complex activities, which create different 
kinds of market failures, most of which are driven by information asymmetries at each phase of the 
lifecycle. Investor protection should minimise the negative effects of these failures on the allocation 
of capital in the economy. Investor protection so far has failed to take a comprehensive approach, 
focusing instead on general clauses in financial regulation and broader market transparency 
requirements that disregard how financial products are originated, distributed and sold up through the 
end of their life span. A comprehensive approach to investor protection, developed around the 
lifecycle of a financial product, would ensure sufficient protection to investors at each of the four 
major lifecycle phases (diagrammed in Figure):  
1) Structuring (origination and distribution);  
2) Marketing (pre-sale);  
3) Execution (sale); and  
4) Final use (after sale).  
Ex ante and ongoing disclosure requirements complement more invasive principles, such as ’know-
your-product’, ‘know-your-customer’ and ‘know-the-security’ rules. 
                                                   
37 The ADR Directive and ODR Regulation should be effective from July 2015 and will apply to all sales and 
service contracts. 
38 Arts 10 and 12, among others, of Directive 2013/11/EU protect the right to a fair trial. 
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Figure 4. Lifecycle approach to investor protection 
 
Source: Authors. 
At origination and distribution level, rules shall make sure that the product and its distribution channel 
are suitable for the class of investors to whom they are offered, without hampering financial 
innovation by imposing on the originator a particular type of product structuring (such as for UCITS). 
Before the financial product is actually sold to investors, the transparency of the product shall be 
simple enough for an average investor to also understand non-market risk, on top of fees and pure 
market risks.  
Moreover, the environment in which the sale of the financial product takes place should be clear to 
the investor (and the supervisor), in order to avoid behavioural failures (such as the framing effect). 
However, improving the ability of the investor ex ante to distinguish between advice (a personal 
recommendation) and pure pre-sale commercial information would not be sufficient and most 
investors would still suffer framing effects. Hence, a sale of financial instrument should always be 
considered ‘non-advised’ (not a personal recommendation) when the sale involves inducements 
(monetary or non-monetary) or other types of interests from the product originator or from the 
distributor of the intermediary that sells the financial product tied to the originator. Ex post this would 
also facilitate the work of supervisors who would be able to identify advised sales more easily, 
thereby ensuring a more effective application and supervision of the suitability test. No intermediaries 
selling financial products with a conflict of interest with the provider or a distributor linked to the 
provider, either with inducements or an ownership stake, should be considered as an advisor and all 
sales should fall under the appropriateness test. A clear ex ante distinction between pre-sale services 
and advice would be beneficial to create the right incentive for a market for investment advice to 
emerge. As discussed earlier, the UK failed in this respect.  
In addition, once the product is sold, the investor is often left on his own, while the financial product 
may even change its original structure. Packaged products may require a minimum level of ongoing 
disclosure to make sure that fundamental changes to market and non-market risks are fully disclosed 
to investors, so they can evaluate whether the original conditions that have led them to buy the 
financial product have changed. For non-packaged products, periodic review of suitability and 
appropriateness tests for that financial product may be a good complement to ex ante investor 
protection. 
Finally, there are additional tools that can complete this comprehensive approach to investor 
protection. First, best execution for some execution services remains vaguely defined, while a 
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narrower definition that reflects the vast majority of the transactions in the market could be an 
effective ‘default’ rule from which parties can deviate, according to their wishes to be negotiated in 
their execution policy with the intermediary. Second, the mechanisms of complaint resolution and 
redress procedures can promote an effective private enforcement mechanism to complement public 
enforcement, which currently fails in properly supervising a wide range of sale practices from a 
centralised infrastructure. Sanctions would also need to reflect that ‘hit-and-run’ misselling strategies, 
due to network effects, can generate high profits with limited responsibility according to sanctioning 
systems in several EU member states. A bolder mechanism to make sanctions more effective and 
harmonised across borders in the EU would greatly complement a life-cycle approach to investor 
protection in the sale of financial products. 
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Annex  
Table A1. Selected behavioural biases and suggested policy approaches 
Bias Concepts Examples Policy approaches 
Procrastination 
and status quo 
bias 
­ Preference to postpone costs even 
if they would generate higher 
future benefits  
­ Preference for short-term benefits 
even if they would generate higher 
future costs (immediate 
gratification) 
­ Preference for short-term over 
long-term gains (hyperbolic 
discounting) 
­ Reluctance to change and 
preference for known alternatives 
(status quo bias) 
­ Consuming luxury today rather 
than saving for retirement 
­ Purchasing the first product offered 
without comparing products and 
providers 
­ Using a costly credit line to 
purchase today rather than saving 
today and purchasing tomorrow 
­ Failing to review portfolio 
­ Invest in the shares of the own 
employer in a non-diversified 
portfolio 
­ Simplify decisions (e.g. 
standardised disclosure, assistance 
to decision making and advice) 
­ Committing devices (e.g. 
automatic enrolment into saving 
schemes) 
­ Default options 
­ Incentives to save (e.g. tax 
advantages) 
­ Deterrents to spend (e.g.  limits to 
early withdrawals) 
­ Financial education 
Loss aversion and 
fear of regret 
­ Individuals will ordinarily put 
more effort in preventing a loss 
than achieving a gain (prospect 
theory) 
­ People demand more for an object 
than they would be prepared to pay 
for it (endowment effect) 
­ Reluctance to sell at a loss (risk-
seeking effect) 
­ Focus on risks in isolation (myopic 
loss aversion)  
­ Fear to regret a decision  
­ Holding onto losing investments 
and selling winning ones 
­ Anger over a loss of capital tends 
to be higher than over a loss of 
returns 
­ Anger over interim losses in long-
term investing products 
­ Underinvestment in equity or other 
products where market risk is 
present 
 
­ Financial education 
­ Simplify decisions (e.g. 
standardised disclosure, assistance 
to decision making and advice) 
 
Mental accounting ­ Creation of artificial budgets for 
each sort of expense (known as 
‘pots’) 
­ Hedonic editing of mental budgets 
(creative bookkeeping) 
­ Borrowing at high-rates while 
saving at low-rates 
­ Buying luxury despite low savings 
­ Financial education 
Information and 
choice overload 
­ Difficulty to process large amounts 
of information 
­ Inability to identify important 
information 
­ Large choice increases the 
likelihood of dissatisfaction   
­ Inaction when confronted with 
large choice 
­ Failure to read prospectuses 
­ Failure to shop around 
­ Framing through information 
overload 
­ Ease comparability (e.g. summary 
disclosure) 
­ Restrict choice 
­ Financial education 
Overconfidence 
Confirmatory bias 
­ Unfounded optimism 
­ Suppression of disconfirming 
evidence 
­ Overestimation of future income 
­ Selective focus on information 
­ Disclosure design 
­ Presentation of alternative 
scenarios 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration based on De Meza et al (2008) and NEST (2010).  
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